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IN THE SUPRExME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROPERTY IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLEON D. TUCKER and BETTY J. TUCKER, 
his wife; WILLARD M. TUCKER and 
PHYLLIS 0. TUCKER, his wife; 
EUGENE S. SIMPSON and JANE DOE SIMPSON, 
his wife; CONTINENTAL ACCOUNT SERVICING 
HOUSE, INC., A Utah Corporation; and 
KEY ACCOUNT COLLECTION HOUSE, INC., a 
Utah Corporation. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Cleon D. Tucker, Betty J. Tucker, 
Willard M. Tucker and Phyllis 0. Tucker. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit upon a promissory note secured 
by a pledge of certain stock,seeking judgment and judicial 
foreclosure of the stock, to which the Defendants raised several 
defenses. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Plaintiff partial summary 
judgment against the individual Defendants only,in the sum of 
$151,878.75, interest, and costs, leaving the amount of attorneys 
fees to be determined later and authorized the Plaintiffs to 
proceed to sell the stock securing the note. 
Case No. 
14237 
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The lower court denied the motions of the Defendants 
Cleon D. Tucker, Betty J. Tucker, Willard M. Tucker and 
Phyllis 0. Tucker (hereinafter called "Defendants Tucker") 
for an order that the order granting summary judgment in part 
would not constitute a final judgment for lien purposes until 
it should be determined whether a deficiency would exist and 
the amount thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Tucker seek reversal of the Amended Order 
Granting Summary Judgment in part and a trial of the out-
standing issues of law and fact. 
Defendants Tucker further seek a reversal of the 
lower court's determination that Plaintiff could proceed to 
obtain a general judgment lien on property of the Defendants 
Tucker for the full amount of the partial summary judgment 
without first exhausting the stock securing the note and 
arriving at a deficiency judgment, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 26, 1974, the Defendants Tucker executed a 
Contract of sale, under which they were to acquire frcm 
Defendant Eugene S. Simpson: a) 8,550 shares of stock in 
Defendant Continental Account Servicing House, Inc. (herein-
after called "Continental") and b) 693,500 shares of stock in 
Defendant Key Account Collection House, Inc. (hereinafter 
called "Key") (R. 45, 62) 
•-*
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Under the terms of the Contract of Salef Defendants 
Tucker were to pay Defendant Simpson $902,000.00 for Simpsonfs 
stock, (R. 46), which represented nearly all of the issued and 
outstanding stock of Continental and over 50% of the issued and 
outstanding stock of Key. (R. 45). 
As part of the overall transaction, Defendants Tucker 
transferred certain interests in land and land contracts to 
Continental and Continental issued 6,000 additional shares of 
stock to the Defendants Tucker. (R. 45, 46) 
5,700 of such additional shares together with the 
8,550 shares in Continental and 69 3,500 shares in Key the Tuckers 
were to purchase from Simpson were placed in escrow to secure a 
loan made by Plaintiff Property Improvement Corporation. (R. 41, 
43, 48) 
On June 19, 1974, Defendants Tucker filed an action 
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah 
against Simpson, Continental and Key alleging that Tuckers were 
induced by Simpson, Continental and Key to enter into the stock 
acquisition contract by means of fraud and misrepresentations 
violating federal and state securities laws. 
Such federal court suit remains pending -awaiting 
trial as of the time of the writing of this brief. 
Defendants Tucker on the one hand and Defendants 
Simpson, Continental and Key on the other, are separately 
represented in this proceeding and have filed separate appeals. 
3. 
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Case No. 142 31 is the number assigned to the appeal 
filed by Defendants Simpson, Continental and Key. Case No. 
14237 is the number assigned to the appeal filed by Defendants 
Tucker. 
The Promissory Note upon which Plaintiff Property 
Improvement Corporation filed suit in the instant suit provides in 
material part: 
In the event that the undersigned shall 
fail to make the aforesaid payment upon the 
due date or within a grace period of 45 days 
thereafter, the entire amount thereof shall 
be due and payable and said Property Improve-
ment Corporation shall proceed to receive that 
stock held as security as hereinafter set forth, 
sell the same at a private sale with five days 
notice to the undersigned, and proceed to look 
to any or all of the undersigned for any de-
ficiency remaining thereon. (R. 41) 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint asserted a security 
interest in the stock of Continental and Key in escrow to 
secure the note. It also asserted an interest in the real 
property transferred to Continental by Tuckers. It demanded: 
a) judgment on the note; b) a judgment that the stock securing 
the note be sold at public auction by the Sheriff, c) that the 
proceeds be applied toward the sums found owing the Plaintiff; 
d) that if a deficiency remained, that the Tuckers1 property 
which had been transferred to Continental be foreclosed and 
sufficient be sold to satisfy the obligation, and e) that if 
any deficiency remained thereafter, that the "Plaintiff have 
judgment and execution against the Defendants, and each of them, 
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency." 
(R. 37-40) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Among the matters raised in defense to the Promissory 
Note by answer and affidavit, was an issue of whether the 
portion of the loan proceeds retained or paid to Plaintiff's 
agent or agents should be deducted from the note or offset 
against any amount found owing to Plaintiff. (R. 27, 77, 86, 
90, 120) 
In response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the lower court left the following matters for later determin-
ation upon presentation of evidence: a) The amount of any 
attorneys' fees to be awarded Plaintiff; b) the issue of whether 
Defendants Continental and Key were liable upon the note; 
c) the issue of whether Defendants Simpson, Continental and 
Key were entitled to a deduction or offset in the amount of 
the loan proceeds received by agents of Plaintiff; d) the 
issue of whether Plaintiff was entitled to foreclose upon the 
Tuckers' property interests that had been transferred to 
Continental. (R 92, 101) 
The remaining issues raised by Defendants' Answers 
and Affidavits were apparently resolved against the Defendants. 
The lower court granted Plaintiff a partial summary 
judgment against the Defendants Tucker and against Defendants 
Eugene S. Simpson and Jane Doe Simpson for the amount of the 
note, interest, and costs. The Court also granted Plaintiff 
a judgment of foreclosure on the stock securing the promissory 
note. (R. 92, 101) 
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Defendants Tuckers entitlement to an offset or 
deduction in the amount of the loan proceeds received by agents 
of Plaintiff was raised by an Affidavit in opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment prior to the Court's 
ruling on Plaintiff's Motion, (R. 86) Such issue was again 
raised by an amended asnwer filed by the Defendants Tucker after 
the court ruled. (R. 115, 120) 
Immediately after the lower court entered an Amended 
Order Granting Summary Judgment in part, Plaintiff recorded 
such amended order or an abstract or transcript thereof in 
Utah County, Carbon County, Duchesne County, Sanpete County, 
Salt Lake County (and Davis County) and perhaps in other 
counties for the apparent purpose of immediately encumbering 
the interests in land owned by Defendants Tucker with a judgment 
lien. (R. 105, 111) 
Defendants Tucker filed motions requesting the lower 
court to vacate, alter, or amend its Partial Summary Judgment 
to provide it did not constitute a general judgment lien and that 
no general judgment lien would arise unless and until the stock 
securing Plaintiff's Promissory Note had been properly exhausted. 
(R. 105-107, 111-113) 
The lower court denied the motions. (R. 130-131) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GENUINE ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WERE PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS AND BY AFFIDAVIT 
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INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF THE LOAN PROCEEDS 
RETAINED OR RECEIVED BY AN AGENT OF THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE 
DEDUCTED FROM THE AMOUNT OWED TO PLAINTIFF, THE ISSUE OF THE 
DOLLAR AMOUNT SO RETAINED, AND THE ISSUE OF THE AMOUNT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(c) ... The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no gen-
uine issue or to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Here the lower court itself recognized that there were 
issues going to the anount of the judgment that should be awarded 
which could not be resolved without a trial. 
The first issue the lower court recognized right in its 
Minute Entry (R. 92) was whether an offset or deduction should 
be allowed in the amount of thu loai proceeds that never reached 
any of the Defendants. 
By Affidavit the Defendants Tucker averred that the entire 
amount of the loan proceeds had gone either to agents of the 
Plaintiff or to the other Defendants. (R. 36) 
It is manifest that if an offset is proper in the amount 
of the loan proceeds retained by a lenderfs agent, then that 
reduces the obligation itself and thus automatically inures 
equally to the benefit of all borrowers. It was manifest error 
for the lower court to in effect hold that the Defendants, all 
7. ..... 
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of whom signed the note in the same capacity, i.e., as makers, 
could be liable for different amounts when they all undertook 
exactly the same obligation to the lender. 
The second issue the lower court recognized was the 
amount of attorneyfs fees to be awarded. With these issues 
unresolved it was manifest error for the lower court to direct 
foreclosure of the stock securing the note. Since the amount 
* of any offset and the amount of attorney's fees on the note 
remained to be determined, there was no fixed dollar liability 
of the Defendants to the Plaintiff against which the proceeds 
of the immediate stock foreclosure sale permitted could be 
measured. There was no predicate for a proper sheriff's return 
showing the amount of a deficit or surplus because there was 
no settled dollar starting point. If the retained loan proceeds 
amount to $50,000.00, Defendants could well argue the Sheriff 
would have to stop selling shares of stock after getting $100,000.00 
since that was the amount of liability to plaintiff that existed. 
If the Sheriff sold stock up to $150,000.00 plus and 
$100,000.00 was the total liability, would the Sheriff be liable 
for wrongful execution or conversion of $50,000.00 plus worth 
of stock? How could the Sheriff know how much to add for attorney's 
fees in arriving at the point at which he should cease selling 
stock? 
The Court obviously erred in granting the partial 
summary judgment granted when it recognized right in its own 
partial summary judgment decision, outstanding issues of fact 
a 
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and law that prevented it from arriving at the actual dollar 
liability of the Defendants. This manifest error alone requires 
reversal and remand without a recitation of the further legal 
issues raised by the defenses to the note set forth in Defendants' 
respective anwers and affidavits. ' 
POINT II 
THE AMENDED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN VACATED, ALTERED OR AMENDED TO SHOW THE SAME 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A FINAL JUDGMENT THAT COULD BE DOCKETED IN 
SEVERAL COUNTIES TO IMMEDIATELY CREATE A JUDGMENT LIEN ON REAL 
PROPERTY PRIOR TO FORECLOSURE OF THE STOCK PLEDGED TO SECURE THE 
OBLIGATION AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ANY DEFICIENCY. 
No provision in the promissory note made Exhibit "A" 
to Plaintiff1s Complaint, (R. 41) no provision in the escrow 
instructions made Exhibit "B" to Plaintiff's Complaint, (R. 43) 
and no provision in the contract of sale made Exhibit "C" to 
Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 45) permits Plaintiff to ignore the 
stock securing the note in favor of a general lien statewide on 
the property of the Defendants Tucker right in the middle of a 
lawsuit brought by Plaintiff specifically demanding that the stock 
be first sold and then that specific land interests be sold, and 
then that a personal judgment be rendered for any remaining 
deficiency. 
The court grossly erred in allowing Plaintiff to thus 
proceed clear outside and beyond not only the terms of the 
9. 
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instruments themselves but even beyond the demands for relief 
contained in Plaintiff's Complaint and Affidavit in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The note plainly provides in material part that upon 
non payment Plaintiff: 
"Shall proceed to receive that stock held as 
security..., sell the same at a private sale with 
five day's notice... and proceed to look to any or all 
of the undersigned for any deficiency remaining 
thereon." (R. 41) 
The escrow instructions plainly state that the stock: 
"Will be held as security for the performance of 
the undersigned in the payment of the promissory note 
owing to Property Improvement Corporation by the under-
signed. If on or before May 13, 1975, your office has 
not received written notification from Property Improve-
ment Corporation that the note has been paid in full 
together with interest due thereon, then you are to 
immediately deliver to Property Improvement Corporation 
all of the said shares together with stock powers 
relative thereto. This you will do without further 
notice or demand from any party hereto." (R. 43) 
The contract of sale plainly provides that if Plaintiff's 
note is not paid by Defendant Simpson should Defendants Tucker 
not pay it: 
"... said escrow agent shall forthwith transfer 
said stock certificates to the individual making said 
loan who may proceed to exercise the same with full 
rights of ownership." 
The above quoted provisions of the agreements relied 
upon by Plaintiff are all of the provisions dealing with and setting 
forth the parties agreements as to what Plaintiff's rights would be 
upon non payment of the note. No provision in the agreements 
gives Plaintiff the right to skip ahead to a general judgment 
10. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lien on all Defendants1 property for the full amount of the 
note even before finding out whether and to what extent there 
might actually be a deficiency after sale of the stock. 
As mentioned above, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
demands: a) a judgment that the stock be sold; b) if a deficiency 
should remain after sale of the stock, a foreclosure sale as to 
the interests in real property Defendants Tucker transferred to 
Defendant Continental; c) if a deficiency should remain after 
such foreclosure sale "that Plaintiff have judgment and execution 
against the Defendant, and each of them, jointly and severally, 
for the full amount of such deficiency." (R. 39-40) 
Plaintiff's Affidavit in support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment demands the same thing as Plaintiff's 
Complaint - judgment and execution against the Defendants for 
any deficiency only after first a sale of the stock and secondf 
a sale of specific real property. (R. 78-79) 
The lower court properly decided a summary judgment 
would not be proper as to Plaintiff's demand for foreclosure of 
certain real property belonging to Defendants Tucker without a 
trial to determine the legal issues involved, but then permitted 
Plaintiff an end run procedure exactly like full exhaustion of 
all security had already occurred. 
The lower court's Partial Summary Judgment and refusal 
to prevent the use thereof as a final personal judgment, gave 
Plaintiff lien rights and imposed upon Defendants Tucker burdens 
• • 1 1 . ' • • " ' 
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way beyond that provided by agreement and way beyond that asked 
by the Plaintiff's own pleadings as well. 
In doing so the lower court compounded the manifest 
legal error that occurred when it granted judgment for a sum, 
reserving for future resolution issues that would push the judg-
ment amount up or down, yet permitting immediate foreclosure of 
the stock securing whatever sum was actually owing. Its action 
placed Defendants Tucker in a totally untenable position. Tuckers 
were thus faced with being compelled to pay whatever Plaintiff 
should demand as the cost of obtaining the release of Plaintiff's 
apparent $151,000.00 judgment lien on Tuckers' property and closing 
down Tuckers1 land development and sales program while trying 
to clear Tucker's titles to land of the unwarranted cloud of the 
order granting summary judgment through this appeal proceeding. 
This the lower court permitted notwithstanding the fact that stock 
securing Plaintiff's note could be expected to totally satisfy 
the same if it brought only a very small fraction of what Defendant 
Simpson insisted it was worth when selling the same stock to 
Defendants Tucker for $902,000.00. 
The result reached by the lower court flies squarely 
in the fact of the ordinary principle of contract law that a 
contract is to be enforced according to its terms. 
Such result is unsupported by and beyond Plaintiff's 
own pleadings. 
Further, such result contravenes the policy and purpose 
of Utah's "one action", "primary fund" rule respecting the 
12. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
foreclosure of mortgages upon real estate and personal property. 
Sections 78-37-1, and 78-37-2, Utah Code Annotated, (1953); 
Boucofski v, Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 Pac. 117(1909); cf 
Walker v. Community Bank, 111 Cal Rptr. 897, 518 P.2d 729 
(1974). 
Finally, Defendants Tucker submit that the lower courts 
"Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part" was not the 
kind of "judgment" intended by the judgment lien statute, Section 
78-22-1, Utah Code Annotated, (1953). 
The latter statute provides: 
From the time the judgment is docketed it becomes 
a lien upon all the real property of the judgment 
debtor, not exempt from execution, in the county in 
which the judgment is entered, owned by him at the 
time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence 
of such lien •.. 
The statute refers to a "judgment debtor". It provides 
for a lien continuing for eight (8) years. It obviously contem-
plates a final personal money judgment upon which a general 
execution might be levied. 
It does not contemplate an interim order authorizing 
foreclosure of property securing an obligation where the question 
of whether and the extent to which there will be a deficiency has 
not yet been determined. See Boyle v. Baggs, 10 Utah 2d 203, 
350 P.2d 622 (1960); Roach v. Roach, 132 N.E.2d 742 (Ohio 1956); 
and McClanahan v. Hawkins, 367 P.2d 196 (Ariz. 1961). 
In Boyle v. Baggs, this Court reaffirmed the construction 
of Utahfs judgment creditor lien statute set forth in Beesley 
v. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 Pac. 458(1925). 
1 ^ 
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In the Beesley v. Badger case, this Court held: 
"that a money judgment may be a lien, it is 
essential, not only that there be a valid and 
subsisting judgment rendered by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction and subject to collection by 
execution, but the judgment must also be for the 
payment of a definite and certain sum of money," 
(emphasis added) 
The general considerations requiring such a construc-
tion were discussed in Boyle v. Baggs; 
(a) An indefinite judgment depending on circum-
stances outside the judgment would put a would be 
purchaser of real property at a disadvantage involving 
possible or probable litigation to definitely determine 
the facts upon which the existence of the judgment 
lien depended. 
(b) It is the policy of the law to keep land 
titles clear and to encourage alienability of property 
rather than the contrary. 
(c) The construction placed on the statute should 
make the statute practical and workable in operation. 
The same policy considerations have resulted in other 
states interpreting and applying their respective judgment credit 
or lien statues the same way. See Roach v. Roach and McClanahan 
v. Hawkins, supra and cases cited therein. 
Non final, inconclusive judgments, if liens or if 
they even appear on the records as possible liens, obviously 
serve only to cloud titles, create confusion, impel title companies 
14. 
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to make exceptions unacceptable to purchasers and hence to 
breed quiet title suits and slander of title actions. 
The lower court1s allowance of Plaintiff's effort 
to cloud all of the Tuckers1 land titles with the order granting 
summary judgment was and is particularly abusive and inappro-
priate here for the reason that the Tuckers1 business and live-
lihood was and is land development and sales, hence the cloud 
created by Plaintiff's recording of the order in county after 
county was and is particularly harmful to the Tuckers because 
of its effect to obstruct sales and prevent the making of contracts 
of sale even though Plaintiffs was not in a position to seek 
a writ of execution. (R. Ill,112) Prospective purchasers obviously 
would hardly agree to buy with the $150,000*00 summary judgment 
appearing on the title report* 
No legitimate purpose was served by the lower court's 
refusal to make it clear that its allowance of a partial summary 
judgment and foreclosure of stock was not a final fixed dollar 
judgment for purposes of the creditor lien statute. 
This court, in Bell v. Jones, 110 P.2d 327 (Utah 1941) 
struck a portion of a judgment that could have been construed 
to cloud title by giving a vendors lien even though this court 
decided the such would not actually be the effect of the language 
stricken. Similar action,sought here by Tuckers^ was the lower 
Court's clear duty. 
15. 
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Clearly no purpose was or is to be served by ignoring 
Tuckers plea thus unnecessarily forcing them either into a 
thicket of further suits concerning their land titles, shutting 
down their business or both when sale of the specific security 
for Plaintiff's note may well satisfy the entire obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
The partial summary judgment should be reversed or 
vacated. 
The lower court should be directed to resolve the 
issue of offset or deduction and the amount of any attorney's 
fees so as to fix the actual amount of Defendants1 liability 
to Plaintiff before directing foreclosure of the security. 
The lower court should be further directed to insert 
provisions in any proper judgment of foreclosure of the security 
hereafter entered/making it clear that such a judgment does not 
give general creditor judgment lien rights under the statute 
and that such lien rights will come into existence only upon 
the docketing of any actual final personal deficiency judgment 
after proper exhaustion of all property securing the obligation 
to Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD 
AND GOTTFREDSON 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
David S. Cook 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 3 
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